Washington State Bar Association

The Ethical Lawyer—Making Ethics a Reality

October 23, 1998

Seattle Public Library

"Legal Ethics: A View From On High"

By the Honorable Richard B. Sanders

The Washington Supreme Court performs two functions in the area of professional responsibility: (1) rule-making and (2) adjudications of alleged violations of the rules. See RLD 2.1 (Supreme Court has "inherent power to maintain appropriate standards of professional conduct and to dispose of individual cases of lawyer discipline and disability.").

I. Ethical Rule-Making

The Supreme Court’s authority to promulgate rules for the practice of the law in discharge of its judicial responsibility emanates from Article IV of the Washington State Constitution. The Supreme Court described and explained its power:

But power to strike from the rolls is inherent in the court itself. No statute or rule is necessary to authorize the punishment in proper cases. Statutes and rules may regulate the power, but they do not create it. It is necessary for the protection of the court, the proper administration of justice, the dignity and purity of the profession, and for the public good and the protection of clients. Attorneys may forfeit their professional franchise by abusing it, and the power to exact the forfeiture is lodged in the courts which have authority to admit attorneys to practice. Such power is indispensable to protect the court, the administration of justice, and themselves; and attorneys themselves are vitally concerned in preventing the vocation from being sullied by the conduct of unworthy members.

In re Lambuth, 18 Wash. 478, 480, 51 P. 1071 (1898).

The Washington Territorial Code of 1881 contained provisions governing attorney admission and discipline. 1881 Code, § 3275-3294. It also prohibited non-lawyers from practicing law. 1881 Code, § 3292. Conflicts of interest were dealt with in sections 3293-294. The modern day Code of Professional Responsibility reiterates these themes, but, as a talisman of this so-called progressive era, in much greater detail.

This temptation to add one rule on top of another is focused through the provisions of GR 9 which generally sets forth a procedure whereby suggested rule changes are sent to the Chief Justice who then transmits same to the Washington State Bar Association for consideration, analysis, and possible referral back to the Supreme Court. Upon referral, if there is a referral, the matter is submitted to the Rules Committee chaired by Justice Charles Johnson and in which also dwells Justices Alexander, Talmadge, and yours truly. The Rules Committee conducts secret monthly meetings except on those occasions when the process is open to others who may have something to add, which the committee would like to have added. The committee then has the option to refer the rule, as it may amend it, to the Supreme Court as a whole at its next en banc meeting, with or without recommendation.

There is little consensus, however, between members of the Supreme Court upon those principles which should be substantively reflected in new rules: there is an expansionist view which would impose greater and greater regulation upon the attorney practitioner with an ever more slender thread of nexus to the everyday practice. There is also a minimalist view which would strip the rules to their bare essentials dealing with only those subjects of greatest concern, whatever they may be, requiring a substantial nexus to the actual practice.

Perhaps this lack of consensus is due, in part, to a lengthy and rich legal tradition whereby various, and sometimes conflicting, ethical aspirations have come to the fore.

A. History of the Regulation of lawyers

An examination of early systems of law reveals common themes underlying the desire to regulate the legal profession, namely regulation of admissions, efforts to maintain lawyer independence, and rules engendering respect for the courts and the rule of law. These themes will be discussed in the context of the system of Roman law, fourteenth century French law and English law.

1. Regulation of Admissions

One of the first steps in regulating lawyers is to control membership. This is particularly important where lawyers have sole right of audience before the courts as it places access in the hands of an elite group. Admission to the legal profession has long been regulated.

One of most developed systems of early law was Roman law, which had at least some restrictions on who could appear in court as an advocate: women were generally prohibited from being advocates (Edward P. Weeks, Attorneys & Counsellors at Law 9 (2nd ed. 1892) (hereinafter Weeks).

Restrictions on membership in the legal profession also existed in 14th Century France, where admission to the bar was reserved largely for nobility (Weeks, supra, at 13).

In England, a complex system of regulating barristers developed through the "Inns of Court" which were societies for the practice and study of law. The Inns each had rules for membership and admissions. One function of the Inns was social and in order to be admitted, members were required to "keep terms" by dining at the Inns a certain number of days per academic term (Weeks, supra, at 22-34).

2. Independence of Lawyers

Perhaps because of the regulation of membership of the bar, it was established very early on that lawyer independence was crucial to a healthy legal system. Lawyers in Rome had an obligation to develop the law, even above the interests of their client (Robert S. Alexander et al., The Lawyer’s Professional Independence 24 (1984) (hereinafter Alexander)). The independence of lawyers was so highly valued that they could not charge fees, but clients were obliged to

promote his [the lawyer’s] honor; to pay his mulcts and fines; to aid him, jointly with the members of his house, in bearing burdens for the commonwealth, and defraying the charges of public offices; to contribute to the portioning of his daughters, and to ransom him or whoever of his family might fall into an enemy’s hands.

Weeks, supra, at 5 (quoting Niebuhr, History of Rome, vol. 1, 277, 279). The law was regarded as a great and noble profession and it was recorded as unseemly for lawyers to charge fees. However, an honorarium was permissible. Alexander, supra, at 5.

In 14th Century France, lawyers could not agree with clients to share in the amount won in a case—in other words, they could not charge contingency fees (Weeks, supra, at 13). Concern for access to justice was also reflected in a rule which required that a lawyer "was not, under pain of being disbarred, to refuse his services to the indigent and oppressed." Weeks, supra, at 13. This has echoes of modern pro bono requirements.

The concept of the independence of lawyers could also be seen in the English legal system. Traditionally, barristers could not seek a fee for work, but were paid by honorarium. However, they benefited from immunity from suit for negligent advice (Alexander, supra, at 11).

3. Respect for the Court and the Rule of Law

Roman law included several provisions relating to the conduct of lawyers. For example, an advocate was to be disbarred if the court appointed him to appear for a party and he unjustifiably refused to do so (Weeks, supra, at 8). This seems to reflect concerns that lawyers should maintain respect for the court, and that parties be represented in the justice system. Another example is an edict which was passed requiring advocates to refrain from personally attacking opponents and concentrate their arguments on the merits of the case (Weeks, supra, at 9). This perhaps reflects concerns for the public image of lawyers and the legal system, and for the efficient administration of justice.

In 14th Century France, prohibitions on lawyers included the following:

1. He was not to undertake just and unjust causes alike, without distinction; nor maintain such as he undertook, with trickery, fallacies, and misquotations of authorities.

2. He was not, in his arguments, to indulge in abuse of the opposite party, or his counsel.

3. He was not to compromise the interests of his clients, by absence from court when the cause in which he was retained was called.

4. He was not to violate the respect due to the court, by improper expressions, or unbecoming gestures . . .

. . .

7. He was not to lead a dissipated life, or one contrary to the gravity and modesty of his calling.

These prohibitions reflect concerns for public confidence in lawyers and in the courts—the idea of lawyers as ‘officers of the court’ seems to have been already well established.

B. Development of Regulation of Lawyers in the United States

The American Bar Association (ABA) was first organized in 1878. Its purposes were "to promote the administration of justice, to advance jurisprudence, to uphold professional honor, and to encourage social intercourse among lawyers." Jerold S. Auerbach, Unequal Justice: Lawyers and Social Change in Modern America (1976). Some interesting anecdotes follow:

In Baker v. Humphrey, 101 U.S. 494, 11 Otto 494, 25 L. Ed. 1065 (1879), the United States Supreme Court gave us its perspective "from on high."

The legal profession is found wherever Christian civilization exists. Without it society could not well go on. But, like all other great instrumentalities, it may be potent for evil as well as for good. Hence the importance of keeping it on the high plane it ought to occupy. Its character depends upon the conduct of its members. They are officers of the law, as well as the agents of those by whom they are employed. Their fidelity is guaranteed by the highest considerations of honor and good faith, and to these is superadded the sanction of an oath. The slightest divergence from rectitude involves the breach of all these obligations. None are more honored or more deserving than those of the brotherhood who, uniting ability with integrity, prove faithful to their trusts and worthy of the confidence reposed in them. Courts of justice can best serve both the public and the profession by applying firmly upon all proper occasions the salutary rules which have been established for their government in doing the business of their clients.

Baker v. Humphrey, 101 U.S. at 502.

Similar lofty concerns were reflected by the Supreme Court of Washington in State ex rel. Dill v. Martin, 45 Wash. 76, 87, 87 P. 1054 (1906). This proceeding was initiated against an attorney for soliciting the client of another, falsely representing that the other attorney had neglected his duty and was "a drinking man," etc. It appears that the attorney being proceeded against continued his representation of the client even while he was a judge of the superior court in which the case was then pending. The court held:

It seems to have been conceded that appellant’s acts as judge could not be examined in this proceeding, but the acts specified in the said finding not only reached to appellant’s conduct as a judge, but they also involved him as a man. Such a conception of the moral responsibilities and proprieties, and such a manifestation attending the conduct of a lawyer when acting as a judge cannot well be divorced from the man himself, when his character and acts as a lawyer are under investigation.

State ex rel. Dill v. Martin, 45 Wash. at 89. Thus it seems a man of the law is a man nonetheless and is often judged in this broader context.

Of further anecdotal interest along this line is In re Bruener, 159 Wash. 504, 294 P. 254 (1930), wherein the respondent attorney was charged with unethical conduct for spending a wanton afternoon with a female juror, "for the purpose of influencing the action of that juror in a cause in favor of respondent’s client." In re Bruener, 159 Wash. at 504. Of note is the stern pronouncement by the majority:

The record is bare of aught in extenuation of respondent’s conduct. To hold that the acts of respondent constituted a mere indiscretion—and such would in effect be the holding if less than disbarment, as recommended by the board, be imposed—would be a palliation of respondent’s offense. We cannot by a softer name make the offense of respondent less evil.

Such conduct as that of which respondent is guilty would render powerless the administration of justice. Whether prompted by curiosity or concupiscence, or whether the purpose be to influence the action of the juror in the cause in favor of his client, when an attorney engaged in the trial of a cause goes on a picnic with a female member of the jury trying the cause, remaining in the company of that woman juror for four hours on a pallet, eating sandwiches and drinking intoxicants, that attorney merits permanent disbarment.

In re Bruener, 159 Wash. at 512.

Justice Holcomb, specially concurring, condemned the lengthy discussion of the events in which the majority engaged as "details [which] will generally be of interest only to avid readers of erotic literature to those perverted appetites this court should not cater." In re Bruener, 159 Wash. at 513. Therefore, following the advice, if not admonition, of Justice Holcomb, I have attached a copy of the case rather than pandering to those who would find interest in details beyond those which are minimally necessary to impress the importance of a high degree of professional responsibility.

In fairness to the accused, however, I will recite some of the concerns of dissenting Justice Tolman, who did not accept as true the respondent attorney’s version of what had occurred, but nevertheless was "convinced that his only purpose was to gratify his passions by which he was then blinded, and that he had no conscious intent to influence the juror." In re Bruener, 159 Wash. at 513. Conceding a violation of the ethical code, Justice Tolman pursued his "only doubt . . . as to the penalty to be inflicted," stating his view of the human condition:

Human nature has its weaknesses and few there are who can withstand every possible temptation, especially if suddenly presented.

In re Breuner, 159 Wash. at 514. Therefore it appears that earlier courts have also failed to achieve consensus on the point in controversy.

Another earlier professional responsibility case was recorded in the annals of the United States Supreme Court: Ex parte Wall, 107 U.S. 265, 17 Otto 265, 2 S. Ct. 569, 27 L. Ed. 552 (1883). There it seems an attorney filed an alternate writ of mandamus to direct a district court judge for the southern district of Florida to show cause why he should not vacate an order prohibiting the respondent attorney from practicing before the court. It seems the attorney had the misfortune of being in the wrong place at the wrong time, i.e., he was a witness, if not an eager one, to a lynching. A majority of the court did not look favorably upon this circumstance, denying the writ. However, Justice Field, in dissent, stated that while he "appreciate[d], to the fullest extent the indignation of the district judge at the lawless proceedings of the mob in his district, in forcibly [sic] taking a prisoner from jail and putting him to death," Ex parte Wall, 107 U.S. at 290, the sanction to be applied against the respondent attorney seemed too severe, all considered:

The power to disbar attorneys in proper cases, though not, perhaps, affected by this law, is not to be exercised arbitrarily or tyrannically. Under our institutions arbitrary power over another’s lawful pursuits is not vested in any man nor in any tribunal. It is odious wherever exhibited, and nowhere does it appear more so than when exercised by a judicial officer toward a member of the bar practising before him.

Ex parte Wall, 107 U.S. at 303.

It does appear that under the circumstances the principle upon which the dissent rested was one of nexus between the practice in the courtroom and the attorney’s activities in off-duty hours. Certainly to a greater or lesser extent the same considerations still are matters of debate regarding the adoption and/or application of already adopted rules. For example in In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against James A. Heard, No. 12272-5 (Wash. Sept. 24, 1998), 1998 WL 652180), a majority of our Supreme Court sanctioned an attorney for engaging in sex with his client despite the fact that no ethical prohibition had been plainly adopted prohibiting same and rejecting the suggestion of yours truly, in dissent, that the disciplinary rule against "the commission of any act involving moral turpitude, dishonesty, or corruption, or any unjustified act of assault or other act which reflects disregard for the rule of law, whether the same be committed in the course of his or her conduct as a lawyer, or otherwise . . . ." (id. at *16) should at least require proof that the act of moral turpitude indeed reflected disregard of the rule of law in some practical sense, rather than simply being a "stand-alone" act of moral turpitude.

Similar concerns may be evidenced in the recently rejected rule which would refuse admittance to attorney applicants who have defaulted on their government guaranteed loans, as well as the still-pending proposed rule which would suspend deadbeat lawyer dads who may be perfectly competent in the practice, but are unwilling to pay their monthly child support obligations.

All of this seems to me, to a greater or lesser extent, to involve a question of whether or not it is the appropriate responsibility of the Supreme Court to (1) make lawyers better people outside the courtroom, and/or (2) impress on them an agenda of "social responsibility" even beyond their personal conduct. Examples of the latter may involve provision of legal services to low income persons either through mandatory personal service or financial contribution.

Such concerns and debates may resonate from historical experience. The Code of 1881 as well as the modern rules of professional responsibility set forth a number of common themes.

C. Themes in Ethical Rule-Making

1. Ethical Rules Set out Minimum Obligations Owed by Lawyer to Client

The RPCs set a floor of behavior below which a lawyer should not fall. This is important when there is a diverse and increasing legal population and lawyers have differing standards. As discussed above, the need for some form of "floor" in the ethical behavior of lawyers has been perceived since at least the time of the Roman Empire.

2. Protection of the Public / Clients

In Bowers v. Transamerica Title Ins. Co., 100 Wn.2d 581, 586, 675 P.2d 193 (1983), the Supreme Court noted its "commitment ‘to protect the public from the activity of those who, because of lack of professional skills, may cause injury whether they are members of the bar or persons never qualified for or admitted to the bar’" (quoting Bennion, Van Camp, Hagen & Ruhl v. Kassler Escrow, Inc., 96 Wn.2d 443, 447, 635 P.2d 730 (1981)).

The primary rules which reflect this concern for protection of the public are the rules for admission (1881 Code § 3275 - 3278; Admission to Practice Rules) and rules for discipline (1881 Code § 3289 - 3290; Rules for Lawyer Discipline). An important corollary to the admission rules is the rule that a non-lawyer should not practice law (1881 Code § 3292; RPC 5.5 (lawyer cannot assist non-lawyer to practice law)). By restricting entry to the profession and by disciplining lawyers who breach the rules regulating the profession, the legal profession seeks to ensure that practice of the profession maintains minimum standards and that the public is satisfied with the service provided. Another facet of this is arguably protectionism (see below).

The rules against conflict of interests also seek to protect clients from the self-interest or conflicting duties owed by a lawyer. Conflicts laws which were stated fairly simply in 1881 (§ 3294) are now much more complex (RPC 1.7 - 1.12).

The modern RPC reflects a concern for protection of the public in several ways which were not manifested in 1881. For example, the fairly detailed rules regarding trust funds (RPC 1.14) have no real counterpart in the 1881 Code, which has only one section stating that if a lawyer does not give a client’s funds back to that client, then a show cause contempt hearing should be held (1881 Code § 3287). Other examples of rules seeking to protect the public are the rules about truthfulness in dealings with third parties (RPC 4.1), and the rule requiring a lawyer to act with reasonable diligence (RPC 1.3).

3. Providing Access to the Legal System

The 1881 Code states that it is the duty of a lawyer "[n]ever to reject from any consideration personal to himself, the cause of the defenseless or oppressed" (§ 3279(7)). This rule is an attempt to equalize access to justice by preventing lawyers from discriminating against certain types of clients. The modern counterpart might be RPC 6.1 which encourages lawyers to render services pro bono to charities and people of limited means. The IOLTA rules (which provide for the interest on certain client trust accounts to go the Washington Legal Foundation, providing legal services for low income people) can be viewed as part of this trend to provide access to the legal system. The licensing of lawyers places the key to the justice system in the hands of those who are licensed: these rules reflect the notion that with the privilege of being licensed comes the duty to ensure that the key to justice is widely available.

4. Maintain Public Standing of Lawyers / Maintain Self-Regulating System

As a self-regulating profession, lawyers have a collective interest in ensuring that they maintain the status of self-regulation. It is therefore in the interests of the legal profession to ensure that lawyers do not bring the profession into disrepute. This is evident from the 1881 Code, which provides that an attorney can be removed or suspended "[u]pon his being convicted of felony, or of a misdemeanor involving moral turpitude", for violation of a court order or for "willful" violation of any of the enumerated duties of a lawyer (§ 3289). The detailed provisions regarding qualification for admission in both the 1881 Code and in the modern RPCs also reflect these interests.

The modern RPCs, however, provide greater detail addressing the concern that the reputation of lawyers should be maintained. The restrictions on advertising (RPC 7.1 - 7.5) can be said to have originated at the beginning of this century from concerns about the public image of the profession, as restrictions on advertising were absent from the 1881 Code. The modern RPC devotes a whole section to "maintaining the integrity of the profession", including a section instructing lawyers to provide information about other lawyers who have caused a "substantial question as to that lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer in other respects" to be raised by violating the RPC (RPC 8.3).

5. Restricting Competition from Non-Lawyers (Protectionism)

The admissions rules are the most obvious part of the ethics code evidencing protectionism. It could be argued that the admissions rules are in place to maintain high standards of competence of members of the bar, but it could equally be argued that the rules constitute a means of limiting competition. Of course, they necessarily drive up the cost of legal services by restricting supply. Compare Cultum v. Heritage House Realtors Inc., 103 Wn.2d 623, 694 P.2d 630 (1985) (real estate brokers may practice—what seems to be law—to cut cost of legal services) and proposed rule to allow out-of-state retired lawyers to perform pro bono work.

6. Maintenance of the Rule of Law / Efficient Court Functioning

One of the most important principles which is apparent from the rules of professional ethics is the idea that lawyers should uphold the rule of law and ensure that justice is done. As noted above, this dates back to Roman times, where a lawyer had an obligation to the development of the law. The 1881 Code compels lawyers to "support the constitution" (§ 3279(1)), to "maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and judicial officers" (§ 3279(2)), to "counsel or maintain such actions, proceedings or defenses, only as appear to him legal and just" (§ 3279(3)) and to "employ for the purpose of maintaining the causes confided to him, such means only as are consistent with truth, and never to seek to mislead the judge by any artifice or false statement of fact or law" (§ 3279(4)). The idea of the lawyer as an "officer of the court" continues today and many of these rules are reflected in title 3 of the RPC.

II. The Role of the Supreme Court In Discipline

The Supreme Court has "exclusive responsibility within the state for the administration of the lawyer discipline and disability system." RLD 2.1.

The Supreme Court has delegated many of its disciplinary powers to the bar association. The Disciplinary Board is appointed by bar association (lawyer members) and supreme court (lay members) (RLD 2.3(a)(1)) and it reviews recommendations for discipline which are made by hearing officers (RLD 2.3(f)). However, the Supreme Court retains its inherent power to regulate lawyer discipline. Every time a disciplinary sanction is imposed upon a lawyer, a copy of the decision is filed with the Supreme Court (RLD 11.2(b)). In serious cases, such as suspension or disbarment where the lawyer does not appeal the action, each chambers will receive a copy of the decision marked "For Information Only - No Action Required."

The Supreme Court also hears certain appeals from disciplinary matters. There are two procedures under which the Supreme Court reviews the decisions of the Disciplinary Board: (1) appeals (review as of right) and (2) discretionary review. In addition the following matters may come before the court: (3) suspension pending the outcome of disciplinary proceedings and (4) admissions to the bar. Each of these will be discussed in turn.

A. Appeals as of Right

When the Disciplinary Board suspends or disbars a lawyer, that lawyer has the right to appeal the decision (RLD 7.2). (Bar Association also has a right to appeal if lawyer not disciplined). If the right is exercised, then the case proceeds to oral argument and the resulting opinion is published. If the right of appeal is not exercised, then the court issues an order disbarring or suspending the lawyer—it comes to chambers as "for information only" memo.

In 1997, 14 lawyers were disbarred, and 13 suspended, making a total of 27 potential appeals. However, in 1997 through 1998, only 4 appeals have been filed with the Supreme Court.

B. Discretionary Appeals

When the Disciplinary Board takes other action, such as reprimanding or censuring a lawyer, that lawyer can ask the Supreme Court to grant discretionary review (RLD 7.3). If the court declines, the order is entered and if it accepts, then the case proceeds to oral argument.

In 1997, 10 lawyers were reprimanded and 7 were censured. Only one filed for discretionary review, but then failed to pursue the matter, and an order for reprimand was subsequently entered.

C. Suspension Pending Outcome of Disciplinary Proceedings

A lawyer can be suspended pending the outcome of disciplinary proceedings under two rules: RLD 3.1 allows for suspension following conviction for a crime, and RLD 3.2 allows suspension where the lawyer’s continued practice would pose a risk to the public, or where the lawyer suffers mental or physical incapacity. A petition must be made to the Supreme Court to effect a suspension under both rules.

Rule 3.1 suspension (crime) is usually signed off by the chief justice, and is not typically reviewed by the whole court. Rule 3.2 suspension (risk to public or incapacity) requires a show cause hearing, in which the whole court will participate.

D. Admissions

The Supreme Court has exclusive responsibility over admissions (APR 1). All admissions cases which are considered by the Character and Fitness committee of the bar association come to the Supreme Court for decision (usually after the applicant has passed the bar exam). These cases are never set for oral argument, but proceed by document review and En Banc discussion. The order made by the court is public (although it is not published—see below) but the admission files are confidential.

E. Publication of Decisions

When a lawyer discipline case proceeds to oral argument, the decision of the court is given in the form of an "opinion", which is published along with other opinions of the court.

However, when a decision of the Disciplinary Board is uncontested, or when a matter before the court En Banc meeting and there is no oral argument, the court’s "order" is not published, but is available to the public.

This supposedly explains why a 50-page dissenting opinion, penned by your undersigned, in In re Clark Garen remains on the spindle without publication, or even posting on the Internet with other unpublished opinions of the Court of Appeals. Amongst other things, Mr. Garen, a California attorney, was denied admission to the Washington Bar because he had left unpaid Los Angeles County real estate taxes which, concluded a majority of the court, constituted morally reprehensible conduct, amongst other things.

III. Personal View from "On High"

Concerns for personal rectitude and social responsibility/conformity should not be allowed to stifle the greatest strength of a lawyer as a free and independent advocate: His or her independence. Regulatory authorities, the Supreme Court included, cannot change human nature nor, do I believe, can they improve upon it. Rather the most we can do is provide a system of incentives to improve competence in the profession and discourage dishonesty in the practice.

Independence of the legal profession is a crucial facet in the ability of lawyers to promote justice and to effectively represent the interests of all clients. If the right to practice law is predicated on membership in a certain political party or upon a belief in certain ideas, a lawyer’s ability to represent a client in a case which challenges those political beliefs or ideas would be seriously compromised. Excessive control through licensing practices may result in lawyers who only half-heartedly pursue their clients’ cases for fear of being disbarred, or may weed out those "trouble-makers" who have traditionally served as the mainspring of human progress.

An interesting case on this point is In re Anastaplo, 366 U.S. 82, 112-13, 115-16, 81 S. Ct. 978, 6 L. Ed. 2d 135 (1961), in which the United States Supreme Court held that it was constitutional for the Illinois Bar to deny admission to an applicant who had named the right of revolution as one of the fundamental principles underlying the Constitution and had subsequently refused to answer questions about his affiliation with the Communist Party. In his eloquent and impassioned dissent, Justice Hugo Black expressed his concerns about the implications of this majority ruling to the independence of the legal profession:

The effect of the Court’s "balancing" here is that any State may now reject an applicant for admission to the Bar if he believes in the Declaration of Independence as strongly as Anastaplo and if he is willing to sacrifice his career and his means of livelihood in defense of the freedoms of the First Amendment. But the men who founded this country and wrote our Bill of Rights were strangers neither to a belief in the "right of revolution" nor to the urgency of the need to be free from the control of government with regard to political beliefs and associations

. . .

. . . The legal profession will lose much of its nobility and its glory if it is not constantly replenished with lawyers like these. To force the Bar to become a group of thoroughly orthodox, time-serving, government-fearing individuals is to humiliate and degrade it.

In re Anastaplo, 366 U.S. at 112-13 and 115-16.